A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market
Damien Besancenot,
Kim Huynh () and
Radu Vranceanu
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Kim Huynh: LEM - Laboratoire d'Économie Moderne - UP2 - Université Panthéon-Assas
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Abstract:
This paper provides a dynamic analysis of the market for academic publications. Given imperfect information about journals' 'editorial line, authors can sometimes target a wrong journal; in turn, the editor will desk-reject their paper. An equilibrium is de ned as a situation where both editors and authors implement their optimal publication strategies, given the matching technology and the prevailing surplus sharing rule. The model can be solved for the equilibrium submission fee, desk rejection rate and ratio between the number of editors and the number of authors.
Keywords: Academic journals; Desk-rejection; Publishing; Matching; Imperfect information.; Imperfect information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-04-28
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00589186
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)
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Related works:
Journal Article: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011) 
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011) 
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2011) 
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2010) 
Working Paper: A Matching Model of the Academic Publication Market (2010) 
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