Bargaining under Incomplete Information, Fairness, and the Hold-Up Problem¤

Ferdinand von Siemens

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining.

Keywords: L2; C78; D82; Hold-up; Relationship-specific investments; Fairness; Reciprocity; Asymmetric information; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-02-25
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00674101
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2009, 71 (2), pp.486. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-00674101/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00674101

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.02.007

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().