Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions

Pierre Courtois and T. Tazdaït
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T. Tazdaït: CIRED - centre international de recherche sur l'environnement et le développement - Cirad - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AgroParisTech - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Keywords: MODIFICATION CLIMAT; CONDITION CLIMATIQUE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published in Ecological Modelling, 2007, 204 (41002), pp.301. ⟨10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015⟩

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Journal Article: Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00716398

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolmodel.2007.01.015

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