Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions
Pierre Courtois and
Ecological Modelling, 2007, vol. 204, issue 3, 301-314
We present an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic climate change decision-making taking into account influential processes occurring during negotiation rounds. Imitation, persuasion and dissuasion are considered. To represent negotiation outcomes, we define a stochastic model derived from concepts of thermodynamics. We use the master equation to describe games of influence. We illustrate the model by simulating the formation and the evolution of a cooperative coalition in the course of a negotiation round. We derive conditions for the emergence and the enlargement of a cooperative agreement.
Keywords: Games of influence; Climate change negotiation; Master equation; Integrated assessment modelling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B52 C73 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Games of influence in climate change negotiations: Modelling interactions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecomod:v:204:y:2007:i:3:p:301-314
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