Leveraged Buy Out: Does the arrival of new targets increase the agents' incentives?

Ouidad Yousfi ()

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Abstract: This paper studies the fiancial capital structure in Leveraged Buy Out (LBO) acquisitions. It analyzes how the arrival of new targets improves the agents' incentives when there is asymmetric information. The entrepreneur and the LBO investor exert unobservable e fforts to enhance the productivity of their project. We show that there are no debt-equity contracts that induce the entrepreneur and the LBO investor to provide the first-best levels of e fforts. The decision of the LBO fund to exit prematurely the entrepreneur's project increases the agents' incentives. We also fi nd that the entrepreneur's incentives increase with the amount of debt and when the LBO investor promises her the whole compensation cost.

Keywords: Leveraged Buy Out; incentives; premature exit; dou- ble moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Research, 2012, 17, pp.99

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00813910

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