The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty

Youcef Askoura, Mohammed Sbihi () and Hamid Tikobaini
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Mohammed Sbihi: MAIAA - ENAC - Laboratoire de Mathématiques Appliquées, Informatique et Automatique pour l'Aérien - ENAC - Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile
Hamid Tikobaini: LMPA - Laboratoire de Mathématiques Pures et Appliquées [Tizi-Ouzou] - UMMTO - Université Mouloud Mammeri [Tizi Ouzou] = Mouloud Mammeri University of Tizi-Ouzou

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Abstract: In this paper we study the existence of the α-core for an n-person game with incomplete information. We follow a Milgrom-Weber-Balder formulation of a game with incomplete information. The players adopt behavioral strategies represented by Young measures. The game unrolls in one step at the ex ante stage. In this context, the mixed-extensions of the utility functions are not quasi-concave, and as a result the classical Scarf's theorem cannot be applied. An approximation argument is used to overcome this lack of concavity.

Keywords: α-core; game with incomplete information; normal form games; behavioral strategies; game with uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enac.hal.science/hal-00924267v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, 49 (2), pp 157-162. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007⟩

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Journal Article: The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00924267

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007

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