The ex ante α-core for normal form games with uncertainty

Youcef Askoura, M. Sbihi and H. Tikobaini

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013, vol. 49, issue 2, 157-162

Abstract: In this paper we study the existence of the α-core for an n-person game with incomplete information. We follow a Milgrom–Weber–Balder formulation of a game with incomplete information. The players adopt behavioral strategies represented by Young measures. The game unrolls in one step at the ex ante stage. In this context, the mixed-extensions of the utility functions are not quasi-concave, and as a result the classical Scarf’s theorem cannot be applied. An approximation argument is used to overcome this lack of concavity.

Keywords: α-core; Game with incomplete information; Normal form games; Behavioral strategies; Game with uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:mateco:v:49:y:2013:i:2:p:157-162

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.01.007

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