 Taxes and subsidies to change eating habits when information is not enough: an application to fish consumptionStéphan Marette (), Jutta Roosen and Sandrine Blanchemanche () Post-Print from HAL Abstract: A calibrated model is used to determine the welfare impacts of various regulatory instruments for improving health. The results of a lab experiment are integrated in a partial equilibrium model representing demands for two kinds of fish, one with higher nutritional benefits (canned sardines) and one with higher contamination risks (canned tuna) in France. In the laboratory, information about health effects leads to a statistically significant decrease (increase) in the willingness to pay for tuna (sardines). Simulations with the laboratory results show that, for most cases, a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines without any information revealed to consumers lead to the highest welfare, because both the tax and subsidy directly internalize health characteristics. The information policy combined with a per-unit tax on tuna and a per-unit subsidy on sardines is socially profitable only if a large proportion of consumers (greater than 95%) receives health information. Keywords: METHYLE MERCURE; FETAL DEVELOPMENT; HEALTHh -; INFORMATION; REGULATION; PREGNANCY; TAXATION; ECONOMIE DU BIEN-ETRE (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2008, 34 (2), pp.119-143. ⟨10.1007/s11149-008-9057-0⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01172882 DOI: 10.1007/s11149-008-9057-0 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.