Is a minimum quality standard socially optimal?

Stéphan Marette ()

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Abstract: This paper explores the role of a minimum quality standard when the quality choice is discrete. A minimum quality standard is never a socially optimal policy under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Conversely, it is often optimal to subsidize or tax the high quality in order to implement different firms' choices corresponding to a situation of welfare maximization.

Keywords: QUALITY; STANDARD (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Published in Economics Bulletin, 2008, 12 (38), pp.1-8

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Journal Article: Is a Minimum Quality Standard Socially Optimal? (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01172886

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