Is a Minimum Quality Standard Socially Optimal?

Stéphan Marette ()

Economics Bulletin, 2008, vol. 12, issue 39, 1-8

Abstract: This paper explores the role of a minimum quality standard when the quality choice is discrete. A minimum quality standard is never a socially optimal policy under Bertrand and Cournot competition. Conversely, it is often optimal to subsidize or tax the high quality in order to implement different firms' choices corresponding to a situation of welfare maximization.

JEL-codes: L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-12-14
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2008/Volume12/EB-08L50013A.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Is a minimum quality standard socially optimal? (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-08l50013

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Economics Bulletin from AccessEcon
Bibliographic data for series maintained by John P. Conley ().