Consumer confusion and multiple equilibria

Stéphan Marette ()

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Abstract: This paper focuses on consumer confusion when firms may choose between credible and non-credible certification systems for signalling quality. It is shown that the presence of confused consumers leads to the emergence of multiple stable equilibria, in which either all firms select the credible certification or all firms select the non-credible certification. A situation with numerous confused consumers is characterized by the complete absence of credible certification.

Keywords: QUALITY; CERTIFICATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published in Economics Bulletin, 2010, 30 (2), pp.1120-1128

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Journal Article: Consumer confusion and multiple equilibria (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01172964

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