Bayesian repeated games and reputation

Antoine Salomon () and Francoise Forges
Additional contact information
Antoine Salomon: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We consider two-person undiscounted and discounted infinitely repeated games in which every player privately knows his own payoffs (private values). Under a further assumption (existence of uniform punishment strategies), the Nash equilibria of the Bayesian infinitely repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with sufficiently patient players. We show that in a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become increasingly patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of two-sided reputation models.

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 59 (Part A), ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Bayesian repeated games and reputation (2015)
Working Paper: Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations (2014)
Working Paper: Bayesian repeated games and reputation (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01252921

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().