Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations

Francoise Forges and Antoine Salomon

No 4700, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This characterization does not apply to discounted games with patient players. In a class of public good games, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted game can be empty, while limit (perfect Bayesian) Nash equilibrium payoffs of the discounted game, as players become infinitely patient, do exist. These equilibria share some features with the ones of multi-sided reputation models.

Keywords: Bayesian game; incentive compatibility; individual rationality; infinitely repeated game; private values; public good; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C72 C73 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bayesian repeated games and reputation (2015)
Working Paper: Bayesian repeated games and reputation (2015)
Working Paper: Bayesian repeated games and reputation (2014)
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