Optimal Design and Defense of Networks Under Link Attacks

Christophe Bravard (), Liza Charroin () and Corinne Touati ()
Additional contact information
Christophe Bravard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]
Corinne Touati: Centre Inria de l'Université Grenoble Alpes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: Networks facilitate the exchange of goods and information and create benefits. We consider a network with n complementary nodes, i.e. nodes that need to be connected to generate a positive payoff. This network may face intelligent attacks on links. To study how the network should be designed and protected, we develop a strategic model inspired by Dziubi´nskiDziubi´nski and Goyal (2013) with two players: a Designer and an Adversary. First, the Designer forms costly protected and non-protected links. Then, the Adversary attacks at most k links given that attacks are costly and that protected links cannot be removed by her attacks. The Adversary aims at disconnecting the network shaped by the Designer. The Designer builds a protected network that minimizes her costs given that it has to resist the attacks of the Adversary. We establish that in equilibrium the Designer forms a minimal 1-link-connected network which contains only protected links, or a minimal (k + 1, n)-link-connected network which contains only non-protected links, or a network which contains one protected link and (n − 1)(k + 1)/2 non-protected links. We also examine situations where the Designer can only create a limited number of protected links and situations where protected links are imperfect, that is, protected links can be removed by attacks with some probabilities. We show that if the available number of protected links is limited, then, in equilibrium , there exists a network which contains several protected and non-protected links. In the imperfect defense framework, we provide conditions under which the results of the benchmark model are preserved.

Keywords: Network defense; Attacks on links; Network design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://inria.hal.science/hal-01384998v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2017, 68, pp.62-79. ⟨10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.006⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://inria.hal.science/hal-01384998v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2016)
Working Paper: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01384998

DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2016.11.006

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().