Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks

Christophe Bravard (), Liza Charroin () and Corinne Touati ()
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Christophe Bravard: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Corinne Touati: MESCAL - Middleware efficiently scalable - Centre Inria de l'Université Grenoble Alpes - Inria - Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et en Automatique - LIG - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INPG - Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, LIG - Laboratoire d'Informatique de Grenoble - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - UJF - Université Joseph Fourier - Grenoble 1 - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INPG - Institut National Polytechnique de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: Networks facilitate the exchange of goods and information and create benefits. We consider a network composed of complementary nodes, i.e., nodes that need to be connected to generate a positive payoff. This network may face intelligent attacks on links. To study how the network should be designed, we develop a strategic model, inspired by Dziubiński and Goyal (2013), with two players: a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer has two potential ways to defend her network: forming destructible links among the given set of nodes to increase connectivity or protecting a group of nodes (with indestructible links). Links formation and protections (indestructible links) are costly. The Adversary then allocates her resources to attack links. We examine two situations which differ according to the number of protections available to the Designer. Our main findings are that if the number of protections is not limited, the Designer should either protect all the nodes, or create a large number of (destructible) links to absorb the Adversary's attack; if the available number of protections is limited, then a strategy that uses protections and links can be the equilibrium.

Keywords: Networks; Attacks on links; Network design; Network defense (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01176928v3
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal Design and Defense of Networks Under Link Attacks (2017)
Working Paper: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2016)
Working Paper: Optimal design and defense of networks under link attacks (2015)
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