Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency
Alessandro Melcarne () and
Giovanni Ramello ()
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Published in Review of Law and Economics, De Gruyter, 2015, 11, pp.149 - 169
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Journal Article: Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency (2015)
Working Paper: Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency (2015)
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