Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency

Alessandro Melcarne () and Giovanni Ramello ()

IEL Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: Although often assumed by economic theory, an efficient judicial system sounds an oxymoron. In this work we suggest an innovative approach investigating the determinants of court performance. Our focus is on the ideal institutional environment fostering the appropriate set of incentives for judges to operate efficiently. In this setting, we find evidence that greater independence enjoyed by the judiciary from politics induces more competition among judges to obtain professional upgrades. Such environment will incentivize ambitious individuals to be more efficient, thus positively affecting the aggregate performance of the judiciary.

Keywords: Judicial Efficiency; Judicial Independence; Judicial Decision-Making; DEA; Clearance Rate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C14 C34 K41 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2015-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency (2015)
Working Paper: Judicial Independence, Judges’ Incentives and Efficiency (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucaiel:19

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