Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy

Emilie Dargaud () and Armel Jacques
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Emilie Dargaud: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - ENS de Lyon - École normale supérieure de Lyon - Université de Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm's choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.

Keywords: R & D/Technology Policy; Antitrust policy; Collusion; Economics general; Economic Theory; International Economics; M-form; Microeconomics; Organizational design; U-form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in Journal of Economics, 2015, 114 (2), pp.153-176. ⟨10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9⟩

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Journal Article: Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy (2015)
Working Paper: Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01450833

DOI: 10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9

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