Hidden collusion by decentralization: firms' organization and antitrust policy

Emilie Dargaud and Armel Jacques

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Abstract: This paper develops a theory concerning the centralization degree of firms involving in multimarket collusive agreements. We examine the impact of exogenous organizational structures on collusive strategy. We then go on to consider the endogenous case. A centralized organization (unitary or U-form) allows price coordination on several markets whereas a decentralized one (multidivisional or M-form) decreases the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market during an investigation in the other. We show that this trade-o ff depends to a great extent on product substitutability and upon the instruments used by the antitrust authority.

Keywords: antitrust policy; collusion; organizational design; M-form; U-form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05-17
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Published in 11th International Industrial Organization Conference (IIOC), Boston, 17-19 mai 2013, May 2013, Boston, United States

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Related works:
Journal Article: Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy (2015)
Working Paper: Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00861216

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