Knowledge Accumulation Within An Organization

Ngo Long, Antoine Soubeyran and Raphael Soubeyran

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Abstract: In this article, we consider a knowledge accumulation problem within an organization that cannot prevent the worker from quitting and using the knowledge outside the organization. We show that knowledge accumulation is delayed: The fraction of working time allocated to knowledge creation is highest at the early career stage, falls gradually, then rises again, before falling finally toward zero. We determine the effect of a change in the severity of the enforcement problem (or the specificity of knowledge). We also discuss the form of the optimal life'cycle wage profiles, the role of the initial knowledge level, and the role of discounting.

Keywords: Economie; quantitative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01463915v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Economic Review, 2014, 55 (4), pp.1089-1128. ⟨10.1111/iere.12084⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: KNOWLEDGE ACCUMULATION WITHIN AN ORGANIZATION (2014)
Working Paper: Knowledge accumulation within an organization (2012)
Working Paper: Knowledge Accumulation within an Organization (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01463915

DOI: 10.1111/iere.12084

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