Network games under strategic complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (), Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroïan ()

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Abstract: We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for uniqueness, covering all concave as well as some non-concave best responses. We then study the relationship between position and action and identify situations where a more central agent always plays a higher action in equilibrium. We finally analyze comparative statics. We show that a shock may not propagate throughout the entire network and uncover a general pattern of decreasing interdependence.

Keywords: Centrality; Interdependence; Network games; Strategic complementarities; Uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://amu.hal.science/hal-01474250v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2014, 88 (C), pp.310--319. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.009⟩

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Journal Article: Network games under strategic complementarities (2014)
Working Paper: Network Games under Strategic Complementarities (2012)
Working Paper: Network Games under Strategic Complementarities (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01474250

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.10.009

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