Network Games under Strategic Complementarities

Mohamed Belhaj (), Yann Bramoullé and Frédéric Deroïan ()

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network effects are large. Action may not be aligned with network centrality and the interdependence between agents' actions may be broken.

Keywords: Bonacich Centrality; Network Games; Strategic Complementarities; Supermodular Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-10
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-00793439v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Network games under strategic complementarities (2014)
Working Paper: Network games under strategic complementarities (2014)
Working Paper: Network Games under Strategic Complementarities (2012)
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