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The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government

Rongili Biswas, Nicolas Gravel () and Rémy Oddou ()
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Rongili Biswas: Maulana Azad College, POLIS - Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - University of Eastern Piedmont
Rémy Oddou: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - UCP - Université de Cergy Pontoise - Université Paris-Seine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Economie; Quantitative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, 41 (2), pp.293-319. ⟨10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01502442

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9

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