The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government

Rongili Biswas (), Nicolas Gravel () and Remy Oddou

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 41, issue 2, 293-319

Abstract: This paper examines the segregative properties of Tiebout-type process of jurisdiction formation by freely mobile households in the presence of a central government which makes equalization transfers across jurisdictions so as to maximize a generalized utilitarian or a max–min objective. It is shown that the introduction of such a central government significantly affects the set of stable jurisdiction structures. It is also shown that the class of households additively separable preferences that guarantees the wealth segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is unaffected by the presence of a central government if this government uses a generalized utilitarian objective. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Date: 2013
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Working Paper: The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government (2013)
Working Paper: The segregative properties of endogenous formation of jurisdictions with a welfarist central government (2013)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0688-9

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