Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation

Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller (), Arnaud Reynaud and Carine Sebi ()
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Laurent Muller: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique
Carine Sebi: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users' profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas.

Keywords: common-pool resource; regulation; permit; tax; taxes; expérience de laboratoire; quota; impôt; ressource commune; réglementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01517242v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Environmental and Resource Economics, 2014, 58 (2), pp.219-244. ⟨10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation (2013)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation (2009)
Working Paper: Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01517242

DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9

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