Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation

Stefan Ambec, Alexis Garapin, Laurent Muller (), Arnaud Reynaud and Carine Sebi ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2014, vol. 58, issue 2, 219-244

Abstract: In a laboratory experiment we test three regulations imposed on a common-pool resource game with heterogeneous users: an access fee and subsidy scheme, transferable quotas and non-transferable quotas. We calibrate the game so that all regulations improve users’ profits compared to free-access extraction. We compare the regulations according to five criteria: resource preservation, individual profits, profit difference, Pareto-improvement from free-access and sorting of the most efficient users. One of the main findings is that, even though it performs better in sorting out the most efficient subjects, the fee and subsidy scheme is not more profitable than tradable quotas. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Keywords: Common-pool resource; Regulation; Quota; Permit; Tax; C91; Q28; Q38; Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: An experimental investigation (2014)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation (2013)
Working Paper: Comparing regulations to protect the commons: an experimental investigation (2009)
Working Paper: Comparing Regulations to Protect the Commons: An Experimental Investigation (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10640-013-9700-9

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