Risky rents

Jean-Daniel Guigou, Bruno Lovat () and Nicolas Treich
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Jean-Daniel Guigou: uni.lu - Université du Luxembourg = University of Luxembourg = Universität Luxemburg
Bruno Lovat: BETA - Bureau d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - UNISTRA - Université de Strasbourg - UL - Université de Lorraine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: In this paper, we consider a symmetric contest game in which agents compete to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a symmetric equilibrium always exists, and that it is unique under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We then exhibit interpretable conditions so that increases in risk and risk aversion decrease equilibrium efforts in this strategic game.

Keywords: Risk aversion; Shared rents; Contest; Rent seeking; Risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01604261v1
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Published in Economic Theory Bulletin, 2016, in Press (2), pp.1-14. ⟨10.1007/s40505-016-0109-9⟩

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Journal Article: Risky rents (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01604261

DOI: 10.1007/s40505-016-0109-9

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