Jean-Daniel Guigou (),
Bruno Lovat () and
Nicolas Treich ()
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Jean-Daniel Guigou: University of Luxembourg (LSF)
Bruno Lovat: Université de Lorraine (BETA-CNRS)
Economic Theory Bulletin, 2017, vol. 5, issue 2, 151-164
Abstract We consider a strategic contest game in which risk-averse agents exert efforts to increase their share of a risky rent. We show that a unique symmetric equilibrium always exists under constant or decreasing absolute risk aversion. We also show that agents exert in general less efforts when they are more risk averse or when the rent is more risky.
Keywords: Contest; Rent seeking; Risk; Risk aversion; Shared rents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Risky Rents (2016)
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