Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach

Christophe Dutang (), Hansjoerg Albrecher and Stéphane Loisel
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Christophe Dutang: LSAF - Laboratoire de Sciences Actuarielle et Financière - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon
Hansjoerg Albrecher: UNIL - Université de Lausanne = University of Lausanne

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Abstract: We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.

Keywords: Non-life insurance; Market model; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Stack- elberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01616156v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, 231 (3), pp.702 - 711. ⟨10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.029⟩

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Journal Article: Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach (2013)
Working Paper: Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01616156

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.029

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