Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach

Christophe Dutang, Hansjoerg Albrecher and Stéphane Loisel

European Journal of Operational Research, 2013, vol. 231, issue 3, 702-711

Abstract: We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.

Keywords: Non-life insurance; Market model; Game theory; Nash equilibrium; Stackelberg equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Working Paper: Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach (2013)
Working Paper: Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: A game-theoretic approach (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ejores:v:231:y:2013:i:3:p:702-711

DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.029

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