 Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust GameGiuseppe Attanasi, Pierpaolo Battigalli () and Elena Manzoni Post-Print from HAL Abstract: In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. But this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore an incomplete-information methodology is called for. We take a Örst step in this direction, focusing on models of guilt aversion in the Trust Game. We consider two alternative modeling assumptions: guilt aversion depends on the role played in the game, because only the ìtrusteeîcan feel guilt for letting the co-player down, guilt aversion is independent of the role played in the game. We show how the set of Bayesian equilibria changes as the upper bound on guilt sensitivity varies, and we compare this with the complete-information case. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help organize experimental results in the Trust Game Keywords: Psychological games; Trust games; Guilt; Incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers) Published in Management Science, 2016, 62 (3), pp.648 - 667. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2015.2154⟩ There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01723199 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Post-Print from HAL |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.