Representation effects in the centipede game

Paolo Crosetto and Marco Mantovani

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Abstract: We explore the effects on strategic behavior of alternative representations of a centipede game that differ in terms of complexity. In a laboratory experiment, we manipulate the way in which payoffs are presented to subjects in two different ways. In both cases, information is made less accessible relative to the standard representation of the game. Results show that these manipulations shift the distribution of take nodes further away from the equilibrium prediction. The evidence is consistent with the view that failures of game-form recognition and the resulting limits to strategic reasoning are crucial for explaining non-equilibrium behavior in the centipede game.

Keywords: experiment; representation effect; backward induction; centipede game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Published in PLoS ONE, 2018, 13 (10), pp.1-13. ⟨10.1371/journal.pone.0204422⟩

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Journal Article: Representation effects in the centipede game (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01885390

DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0204422

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