Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence

Nicolas Pasquier, Olivier Bonroy and Alexis Garapin
Additional contact information
Nicolas Pasquier: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2018-11-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published in ASSET Conference 2018, Association of Southern-European Economic Theorists, Nov 2018, Florence, Italy

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Working Paper: Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02096016

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().