Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence

Nicolas Pasquier, Olivier Bonroy and Alexis Garapin
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Nicolas Pasquier: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019], UGA UFR FEG - Université Grenoble Alpes - Faculté d'Économie de Grenoble - UGA [2016-2019] - Université Grenoble Alpes [2016-2019]

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Date: 2018-08-31
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Published in EARIE Conference 2018, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, Aug 2018, Athènes, Greece

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Related works:
Working Paper: Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence (2018)
Working Paper: Secret contracts, beliefs and risk aversion: experimental evidence (2017)
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