Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

Francoise Forges, Ulrich Horst and Antoine Salomon
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Ulrich Horst: Institut für Mathematik [Berlin] - TUB - Technical University of Berlin / Technische Universität Berlin, HU Berlin - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin = Humboldt University of Berlin = Université Humboldt de Berlin, Department of Mathematics - HU Berlin - Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin = Humboldt University of Berlin = Université Humboldt de Berlin
Antoine Salomon: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

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Abstract: We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy" against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We also consider the extension of the result when both players have private information.

Keywords: Commitment; Cooperative solution; Joint plan equilibrium; Folk theorem; Private information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published in International Journal of Game Theory, 2016, 45 (1-2), ⟨10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (2016)
Working Paper: Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02276751

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0520-8

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