Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games

Francoise Forges, Ulrich Horst and Antoine Salomon ()
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Antoine Salomon: LEDa - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres

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Abstract: We define feasible, posterior individually rational solutions for two-person Bayesian games with a single informed player. Such a solution can be achieved by direct signalling from the informed player and requires approval of both players after the signal has been sent. Without further assumptions on the Bayesian game, a solution does not necessarily exist. We show that, if the uninformed player has a "uniform punishment strategy"against the informed one, the existence of a solution follows from the existence of Nash equilibrium in infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. We consider the extension of the result when both players have private information. We are grateful to

Keywords: Game Theory; Repeated Games; Incomplete Information; Solution concept (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-11-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (2016)
Working Paper: Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games (2016)
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