Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching
Marie-Aude Laguna and
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Daniel Ferreira: CEPR - Center for Economic Policy Research - CEPR
Marie-Aude Laguna: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris-Dauphine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Yasmine Skalli: DRM - Dauphine Recherches en Management - Université Paris-Dauphine - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
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We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third followingthe introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.
Keywords: labour market; corporate directors; gender quotas (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Published in American Finance Association 2019 Annual Meeting, Jan 2019, Atlanta, United States
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Working Paper: Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02302287
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