Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching

Daniel Ferreira, Edith Ginglinger, Marie-Aude Laguna and Yasmine Skalli

No 12117, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study the impact of board gender quotas on the labor market for corporate directors. We find that the annual rate of turnover of female directors falls by about a third following the introduction of a quota in France in 2011. This decline in turnover is more pronounced for new appointments induced by the quota, and for appointments made by firms that regularly hire directors who are members of the French business elite. By contrast, the quota has no effect on male director turnover. The evidence suggests that, by changing the director search technology used by firms, the French quota has improved the stability of director-firm matches.

Keywords: Corporate boards; Gender quotas; Corporate governance; Labor markets; Matching; Turnover (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 G38 J63 J70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-eur, nep-gen and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Board Quotas and Director-Firm Matching (2019)
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