Fiducia o incentivi? Come vincere la sfida del privacy concern nell'e-commerce

Sandro Castaldo and Monica Grosso
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Monica Grosso: EM - EMLyon Business School

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Abstract: Internet merchants are compelled to collect personal information from customers in order to deliver goods and services effectively and improve Customer Relationship Management's (CRM) efficacy. However, the ease with which data can be acquired and disseminated across the web has led to many potential customers demonstrating growing concerns about disclosing personal information. The article analyzes the interaction between two strategies that firms can use to alter potential customers' cost/benefit evaluation and increase information disclosure: the development of initial trust and compensation. The derived hypotheses are tested by means of two experimental studies, whose findings are compared across two different consumer target groups. The results of the research show some caution in the use of monetary incentives aimed, which may be an important signal of distrust in perceptions of customers.

Keywords: Informazioni sensibili; Sensitive details; Online privacy; E-commerce (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-08-01
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Published in Economia & Management, 2015, 4, 98-113 p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02313265

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