Can shorter transfer chains and transparency reduce embezzlement?

Salvatore Di Falco, Brice Magdalou, David Masclet (), Marie Claire Villeval and Marc Willinger

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We study embezzlement when donations have to pass through intermediaries to reach recipients, by means of a sequential game tested in a laboratory experiment conducted in Tanzania. We investigate the impact on the amount embezzled of both the number of intermediaries in transfer chains and transparency about the donation. We show that donors are less generous in the presence of intermediaries. When transfer chains are shorter, aggregate embezzlement decreases, at least when donations are transparent. At the individual level, intermediaries embezzle less, the longer the transfer chain; this is due to less embezzlement at the beginning of the chain. We fail finding significant positive effects of transparency on the honesty of individual transfers through social judgment. JEL Codes: C91, D73, O19

Keywords: Embezzlement; corruption; donations; transparency; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02498354v1
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published in Review of Behavioral Economics, 2020, 103-143, 7 (2), ⟨10.1561/105.00000119⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02498354v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can Shorter Transfer Chains and Transparency Reduce Embezzlement? (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02498354

DOI: 10.1561/105.00000119

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().