Overburdened judges

Ludivine Roussey and Raphael Soubeyran
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Ludivine Roussey: UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5

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Abstract: We develop a double-sided moral hazard model in which the production of justice depends on two tasks (jurisdictional and administrative). The jurisdictional task can be provided only by a judge (the agent) while the administrative task can be provided either by the government (the principal) and/or by the judge. However, the judge performs the administrative task at a higher unit cost. First, we show that the rst-best situation is such that the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task. Second, we show that two forms of (second-best) optimal contract can emerge when neither the government's effort nor the judge's effort is contractible: either the incentives are shared between the government and the judge and the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task, or the judge faces high-powered incentives which induce her to exert effort to provide both tasks. Our model proposes a rationale for judges work overload observed in many countries.

Keywords: double-sided moral hazard; task misallocation; judicial organization; production of judicial services (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02621924v1
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Published in International Review of Law and Economics, 2018, 55, pp.21-32. ⟨10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003⟩

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Journal Article: Overburdened judges (2018)
Working Paper: Overburdened judges (2018)
Working Paper: Overburdened judges (2018)
Working Paper: Overburdened judges (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02621924

DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003

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