Ludivine Roussey and
Raphael Soubeyran ()
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Ludivine Roussey: LIRAES - EA 4470 - Laboratoire Interdisciplinaire de Recherche Appliquée en Economie de la Santé - UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, UPD5 - Université Paris Descartes - Paris 5, USPC - Université Sorbonne Paris Cité
CEE-M Working Papers from CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro
We develop a double-sided moral hazard model in which the production of justice depends on two tasks (jurisdictional and administrative). The jurisdictional task can be provided only by a judge (the agent) while the administrative task can be provided either by the government (the principal) and/or by the judge. However, the judge performs the administrative task at a higher unit cost. First, we show that the rst-best situation is such that the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task. Second, we show that two forms of (second-best) optimal contract can emerge when neither the government's effort nor the judge's effort is contractible: either the incentives are shared between the government and the judge and the judge exerts no effort to provide the administrative task, or the judge faces high-powered incentives which induce her to exert effort to provide both tasks. Our model proposes a rationale for judges work overload observed in many countries.
Keywords: production of judicial services; double-sided moral hazard; judicial organization; task misallocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01936006
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Journal Article: Overburdened judges (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpceem:halshs-01936006
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