L'utilisation stratégique des instances de normalisation environnementale

Hounaida Ben Youssef, Gilles Grolleau () and Khaïreddine Jebsi
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Hounaida Ben Youssef: Université de Sousse

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Abstract: Despite the several benefits attributed to voluntary standards, these standards may open room to strategies aiming at disadvantaging rivals. We identify several ‘vulnerable areas' related to the standard setting, implementation and enforcement stages where such strategies may arise. Indeed, each stage can constitute a strategic area where a firm (or a group of firms) may attempt to raise its rivals' costs (Salop and Scheffman 1983; Salop and Scheffman 1987) while legitimizing its behavior by welfare enhancing arguments. Indeed, instigators may ‘instrumentalize' the pro-environmental effects or the consumer protection provided by their devices to capture the standard process. Three brief case studies – i.e., Allied Tube, Bic, DuPont de Nemours – are developed to illustrate the risks related to the standardization process. We also stress potential counter strategies and draw some policy considerations, especially the ambiguous effects on society welfare.

Keywords: AUGMENTATION DES COUTS; ANTI-CONCURRENCE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Published in Revue internationale de droit économique, 2005, 4, pp.367-388. ⟨10.3917/ride.194.0367⟩

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Journal Article: L'utilisation stratégique des instances de normalisation environnementale (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02678969

DOI: 10.3917/ride.194.0367

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