Buyer power and category captainship

Claire Chambolle (), Vanessa Schlippenbach () and Pascale Bazoche
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Vanessa Schlippenbach: DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung

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Abstract: We consider one retailer and two manufacturers that have private information about demand characteristics. To ensure truthful revelation, the retailer provides one of the suppliers, i.e. category captain, with a rst-mover advantage in the negotiations. After the negotiation with the retailer is completed, the category captain reveals the information truthfully. This enables the retailer to use the information in the negotiation with the rival supplier. Accordingly, the retailer and the category captain are able to extract rent from the rival supplier. However, the revelation of information after the rst negotiation weakens the rent-shifting mechanism to the bene t of all fi rms.

Keywords: category captainship; vertical relation; buyer power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-09-02
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Published in EARIE 2012, European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE). Bruxelles, BEL., Sep 2012, Rome, Italy. 19 p

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02810408

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