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Optimal privatization design and financial markets

Stefano Bosi (), Guillaume Girmens and Michel Guillard ()
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Stefano Bosi: EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne
Guillaume Girmens: EPEE - Centre d'Etudes des Politiques Economiques - UEVE - Université d'Évry-Val-d'Essonne

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Abstract: This paper provides a simple general equilibrium analysis of privatization, exploring its real effects. They derive from the expansion of risk-sharing opportunities (within an incomplete markets setting) that are created by the addition of a market in the public project property rights. The principal conclusion is that an optimal combination of voucher and share issue privatization can implement the first-best. © 2005 Blackwell Publishing, Inc.

Date: 2005-12
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02877996
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Published in Journal of Public Economic Theory, Wiley, 2005, 7 (5), pp.799--826. ⟨10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00246.x⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02877996

DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00246.x

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