Optimal Privatization Design and Financial Markets
Guillaume Girmens and
Michel Guillard ()
Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2005, vol. 7, issue 5, 799-826
This paper provides a simple general equilibrium analysis of privatization, exploring its real effects. They derive from the expansion of risk‐sharing opportunities (within an incomplete markets setting) that are created by the addition of a market in the public project property rights. The principal conclusion is that an optimal combination of voucher and share issue privatization can implement the first‐best.
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Working Paper: Optimal privatization design and financial markets (2005)
Working Paper: Optimal Privatization Design and Financial Markets (2001)
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