Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection

Martin Boyer (), Philippe De Donder, Claude Fluet, Marie-Louise Leroux and Pierre-Carl Michaud
Additional contact information
Martin Boyer: HEC Montréal - HEC Montréal

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper conducts a stated-choice experiment where respondents are asked to rate various insurance products aimed to protect against nancial risks associated with long-term care needs. Using exogenous variation in prices from the survey design and individual cost estimates, these stated-choice probabilities are used to predict market equilibrium for long-term care insurance. Our results are twofold. First, information frictions are pervasive. Second, measuring the welfare losses associated with frictions in a framework that also allows for selection, it is found that information frictions reduce equilibrium take-up and lead to large welfare losses while selection plays little role.

Keywords: Long-term care insurance; adverse selection; stated-preference; health; insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-dcm, nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-ias
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02929780v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Published in American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2020, 12 (3), pp.134-169. ⟨10.1257/pol.20180227⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://hal.science/hal-02929780v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection (2020)
Working Paper: Long-Term Care Insurance: Information Frictions and Selection (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02929780

DOI: 10.1257/pol.20180227

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().