On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

Matias Nuñez and Remzi Sanver

Post-Print from HAL

Date: 2020-09-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://enpc.hal.science/hal-03092402v1
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, 56, pp.421-441. ⟨10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9⟩

Downloads: (external link)
https://enpc.hal.science/hal-03092402v1/document (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules (2021)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03092402

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().