On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules

Matias Nuñez and Remzi Sanver

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 56, issue 2, No 8, 441 pages

Abstract: Abstract Abreu and Sen (J Econ Theory 50(2):285–299, 1990) provide a necessary condition, called Condition $$\alpha $$ α , which is almost sufficient for a social choice rule to be implementable via subgame perfect equilibria. Yet, it is not straightforward to check the satisfaction of Condition $$\alpha $$ α . We contribute in this direction by establishing a nuanced picture over the subgame perfect implementability of compromise rules, as a function of the compromise threshold. This contrasts with scoring rules that all fail to be subgame perfect implementable and with several Condorcet rules which are subgame perfect implementable.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01293-9

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