Distribution of the benefits of regulation vs. competition: The case of mobile telephony in South Africa

Ryan Hawthorne and Lukasz Grzybowski

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Abstract: We test for the distributional effects of regulation and entry in the mobile telecommunications sector in a highly unequal country, South Africa. Using six waves of a consumer survey of over 134,000 individuals between 2009-2014, we estimate a discrete choice model allowing for individual-specific price-responsiveness and preferences for network operators. Next, we use a demand and supply equilibrium framework to simulate prices and the distribution of welfare without entry and mobile termination rate regulation. We find that, in the South African context, regulation benefits consumers significantly more than entry does, and that high-income consumers and city-dwellers benefit more in terms of increased consumer surplus.

Keywords: Mobile telecommunications; Regulation; Entry; Termination rates; Discrete choice JEL Classification: L13; L40; L50; L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dcm, nep-ict, nep-pay and nep-reg
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://telecom-paris.hal.science/hal-03235928v1
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Published in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2021, 74, pp.102673. ⟨10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102673⟩

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Journal Article: Distribution of the benefits of regulation vs. competition: The case of mobile telephony in South Africa (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03235928

DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102673

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